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  Unitary models, assuming a single objective function and unified budget constraint, are 
traditionally used to model household behavior.  Most empirical tests of unitary models rely on 
endogenous regressors.  This paper uses an exogenous change in the intrahousehold distribution 
of income, provided by a change in U.K. Family Allowance policy.  Expenditure shares are 
estimated for a wide range of goods.  Shifts in expenditure shares for assignable goods, such as 
men’s clothing, children’s clothing, and men’s tobacco, suggest that children benefited at the 
expense of men when this policy change shifted income within households from men to women.  
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I. Introduction 
In the past two decades, there has been much discussion of, and many attempts to test, the 
“pooling hypothesis” implied by unitary models of household decision-making against the set of 
alternative collective models.
1  Unitary models assert that a household behaves like an 
individual, maximizing a single objective function subject to a unified budget constraint.  One 
implication of these models is that household members pool their income, and that who controls 
what proportion of that income does not affect household demands. 
Empirical tests of income pooling are typically plagued by potential biases due to the 
endogeneity of measures of control over income in the household.  In cross section data, the 
magnitude and distribution of income in the household may be correlated with the preferences of 
and prices faced by family members.  Clearly what is needed for a test of pooling is an 
experiment generating variation in intra-household income control.  In the late 1970s, the U.K. 
changed the form of its universal child benefit scheme, essentially shifting receipt of transfer 
income from fathers to mothers in two-parent families.  This “natural experiment” provides an 
exogenous source of variation in the control of resources within the family. Using aggregated 
data, grouped by household composition and income, Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) 
(LPW) find that ratios of children’s to men’s and of women’s to men’s clothing expenditures in 
households with children in the U.K increased after this policy change took effect.  This study 
did not control for changes in relative prices of the three goods, and was limited in the goods 
examined. 
                                                           
1 Lundberg and Pollak (1996) provide a comprehensive discussion of both the theoretical and empirical literature.   3
In this paper, I use household-level data to test for changes in expenditure patterns for a 
broader range of goods, using a single-difference model in a time series of cross sections.
2  I 
estimate the effect of the policy change on the share of the budget allocated to each of a 
comprehensive set of eleven broadly defined goods categories.  The hypothesis that expenditure 
shares for all these goods were unaffected by the shift in income control is strongly rejected.  
While any significant change in expenditure patterns attributable to this policy change warrants a 
rejection of income pooling, testing the pooling hypothesis using goods that are assignable to 
particular household members is comparatively more appealing. 
I estimate budget shares for men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing, controlling for 
prices of each of these goods
3.  Results are consistent with those of LPW.  I also estimate budget 
shares for several narrowly defined goods that may be of greater interest either to men or to 
women, or of particular relevance to child welfare.  I find shifts in expenditures on some quasi-
assignable goods that are generally in the direction a collective model would predict, given the 
direction of change in control over household income.  For instance, men's clothing and a men's 
tobacco category - consisting of cigars, pipe tobacco, and snuff products - decline, while 
children's clothing, toys, and pocket money, and restaurant and take-away meals increase as a 
share of total expenditure. 
  The paper is organized as follows:  Section two provides some theoretical and empirical 
background motivating this research, including a discussion of the change in the Family 
                                                           
2 It seems appealing to use married couples with no children in the household as a control group, since they were 
unaffected by this policy change.  I explored this possibility for all the goods examined here.  I find, for the majority 
of these goods, that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the time trends in the four years before the policy change 
differ between these two groups, and thus conclude that couples with no children are not a good control group.  
That group contains couples who are childless and will remain so, couples who have not yet had children, and those 
who have already raised their children.  In these data, it is impossible to distinguish these from one another.  It is 
plausible that any of these three groups may behave differently than couples with children, say, with respect to 
women’s labor force participation for example, and thus have different time trends in expenditures.   4
Allowance policy.  Section three discusses the data; and section four, the empirical models.  
Section five presents results and their implications; and section six concludes. 
 
II. Background 
Traditional economic theory avoids the difficult issue of how decisions are made in 
households by assuming each household maximizes a single objective function subject to a 
unified budget constraint.  Samuelson (1956) suggests that this objective function might be 
arrived at through consensus among family members.  Becker (1981) proposes it may represent 
the preferences of an altruist (dictator) in the household. The restrictions imposed by the unitary 
models of Samuelson and Becker are strong ones.  The household objective function is assumed 
to have the properties of a utility function, and to be invariant to who controls resources in the 
household.  One restriction implied by such models is that household members pool their 
resources.  This pooled income is then used to maximize the household objective function.  This 
implies that only total household income, not its distribution, affects household demands.  
This has important practical implications for policies targeted at improving the welfare of 
particular household members, such as women or children.  Income pooling results in transfers 
to targeted household members being neutralized by the household allocation mechanism.  The 
welfare of the targeted member may be improved, but no more or less than if the transfer had 
been given to another household member.  Cash transfers, as well as transfers in kind, may be 
subject to this reallocation. 
The concept of individual rational choice, which lies at the heart of microeconomic 
theory, compels us to consider the possibility that each person may have distinct preferences, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 LPW used only an aggregate clothing category price index, while this study utilizes separate price indices for each   5
that there may therefore be competing interests of individuals within a household.  Social choice 
theory has demonstrated that aggregating preferences is no simple matter, and that the aggregate 
function arrived at may be sensitive to the mechanism of aggregation. 
Relatively recent theoretical work allows for the possibility that each adult in the 
household has distinct preferences, and analyzes how their competing interests are reconciled.
4 
Models which do not impose pooling have been introduced, including general collective models 
(Chiappori 1988, 1992), and both cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models due to 
Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Bergstrom (1996), and Lundberg and 
Pollak (1993, 1994), among others.  These models allow income accruing to different family 
members to affect household demands differently.  For instance, in Nash bargained solutions, 
each person's (potential) income affects his or her reservation level of utility, or threat point, and 
therefore his or her equilibrium level of utility in the household.  Thus, these models allow for 
more effective targeted transfer policies.  In cases where the difference in predictions of and 
unitary models is important, and if unitary models make poor predictions, then collective 
household models must be considered. 
  Endogeneity of the distribution of income within the household creates obstacles to 
testing the pooling hypothesis. An obvious example is earned income.  Its distribution and 
magnitude depend on hours worked by each spouse, which are determined jointly with 
household expenditures. Unearned income is also likely to be endogenous with respect to 
household behavior.  For instance, income from assets may be correlated with past labor supply, 
and thus with current labor supply as well.  Transfers, both public and private, are typically 
conditioned on some set of criteria over which household members exercise some control.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the three sub-categories.   6
Sources of unexpected unearned income that are not subject to these concerns tend to be 
sporadic and insignificant. Previous attempts to test the pooling hypothesis, including Thomas 
(1990), Schultz (1990), Phipps and Burton (1998), and Bourguinon, Browning, Chiappori, and 
Lechene (1993) have used some of these problematic sources of income.  These tests have 
generally rejected pooling, but possible endogeneity biases call those results into question. 
  Another hurdle in testing for income pooling is that consumption data are typically 
collected at the household, not the individual, level.  Though individual expenditures are 
collected by some surveys, the purchaser is not necessarily the consumer.  We cannot assign 
consumption of most goods to any one person, and the possibility of interdependent preferences 
makes it even more problematic to assign utility from consumption.  However, complete 
assignability is not required.  Examining goods which are of greater interest to some household 
members than to others, such as the three clothing categories examined by LPW, provides an 
intuitive means of testing the pooling hypothesis, and whether any shifts in expenditure patterns 
are consistent with what we would expect in the context of collective models. 
  In the United Kingdom in the late 1970s, the child benefit scheme was altered in such a 
way as to shift income from fathers to mothers in two-parent households.  Prior to 1977, the 
universal child benefit scheme in the U.K. consisted of a small taxable Family Allowance 
payment to the mother, and a more significant Child Tax Allowance, which reduced the amount 
of taxes withheld from earned income.  The latter generally would have increased the father’s 
take home pay.  This two-part program was phased out over the period April 1977 to April 1979 
and replaced by the Child Benefit, a non-taxable cash payment to the mother.  While the average 
amount of the total benefit stayed roughly constant, this policy change shifted apparent control 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Carolyn Moehling (1997) extends this to include children as household decision-makers.    7
of a portion of family income from fathers to mothers.  The amount of income involved is a 
significant fraction of the average family's budget.  For example, for a family with two children 
in April 1980, the Child Benefit was approximately 445 British pounds per year
5 (approximately 
180 pounds in 1974 currency), or about 8% of male manual earnings in the UK.
6  The real value 
of that benefit is 7.5% of average total expenditure among families with one to three children in 
the data used for this study.  In April 1974, the Family Allowance paid to the mother in a two-
child family was 47 pounds.  Since Family Allowance was taxable and Child Benefit was not, 
the difference of 134 pounds can be viewed as an upper limit of the amount of income shifted to 
the wife. 
Based on this policy shift,
7 which is clearly exogenous with respect to individual 
household expenditure decisions, LPW present empirical evidence against the pooling 
hypothesis using grouped data on household expenditures.  Using expenditure data from before 
and after the policy change, they “find strong evidence that a shift towards relatively greater 
expenditures on women’s goods and children’s goods coincided with this income redistribution.” 
(p.1)  Limitations of the aggregated data dictated some shortcomings, such as a concentration on 
clothing, and limited demographic controls.
8  Each cell in this data consists of the mean of 
expenditures on a category of goods for all families in the sample which fall into a particular 
income–family-size group.  The small number of cells in the data make it difficult to distinguish 
effects of the policy change from time trends.  Another potential confounder is the 1979 change 
in the value-added tax (VAT) rate.  This rate rose from 8% to 15%, and at the same time, 
clothing and footwear for young children gained zero-rated status.  This change, occurring 
                                                           
5 Social Security Statistics (1991), Table G1.01, p. 253. 
6 U.K. House of Commons Hansard, 14 January 1980, pp. 641-2. 
7 See Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1995) for a more detailed discussion of the policy change. 
8 LPW did examine alcohol and tobacco expenditures but did not find significant changes.   8
around the time of the change in the Child Benefit, likely affected the relative price of adult and 
children’s clothing.  LPW use a price index for the aggregate category, clothing and footwear.  
Thus, the decline they find in the ratio of children’s clothing expenditures to men’s clothing 
expenditures may be attributable in part to changes in relative prices for which they are unable to 
control. 
I use separate price indices for the three clothing categories in estimates presented here.  
Since a change in the relative price of children's clothing is of primary concern in connection 
with the VAT change, this addresses whether mothers appear to allocate more resources to 
children than do fathers, as has been suggested by a number of other studies examining intra-
household allocation issues. 
Using household-level data from the Family Expenditure Survey, I estimate budget 
shares for some narrow goods categories which may be to some extent assignable to certain 
members of the household, including men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing and footwear, and 
some other narrowly defined goods, such as men’s tobacco products.  Since the policy change 
gives wives control over a greater proportion of household income, we would expect to see a 
shift in consumption toward goods which are of relatively greater interest to wives. Such shifts 
would warrant a rejection of pooling, and thus provide evidence against the unitary model.  The 
nature of these shifts also have important implications for the effectiveness of policies intended 
to improve welfare for targeted household members. 
   9
III. Data and Sample Construction 
The Family Expenditure Survey is conducted annually in the U.K.  Ten thousand 
households are randomly selected each year, approximately seventy percent of which complete 
the survey.  One or more face-to-face interviews are conducted with one or more members of 
each household.  In addition to these interviews, each “spender”
9 in the household completes a 
personal spending diary for a period of two weeks.  From the interviews and the diaries, detailed 
information on household expenditures, income, and household demographics is compiled.  
Some expenditure items, such as food and clothing, are covered only in the diaries.  For other 
items, such as fuel and housing expenditures, detailed interview questions supplement the 
information from the diaries.  Expenditures are reported as weekly values. 
The survey is spread over the entire the year, making it possible to control for seasonal 
effects on expenditures.  The data include the region in which the household is located: Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, Wales, or one of nine regions in England.  The data are collected by the Office 
of Population Censuses and Surveys Social Survey Division for the Department of Employment.  
The data archive is maintained by the Economic and Social Research Council Data Archive at 
the University of Essex.
10 
The primary purpose of the survey is to provide the weights for construction of the Retail 
Price Index.  However, the data are intended to also be useful for research purposes.  They 
include detailed income information by source and by household member.  The age and sex of 
each household member are reported, as well as the number of persons by sex in each of several 
age categories.  I use these categories for children (aged under 2 years, aged 2 but less than 5, 
                                                           
9 A spender is defined as anyone at least age 15 prior to 1973, or at least age 16 beginning in 1973.  
10 Material from the Family Expenditure Survey is Crown Copyright, has been made available by the Central 
Statistical Office through the ESRC Data Archive, and has been used by permission.  Neither the CSO nor the 
ESRC Data Archive bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here.   10
aged 5 but less than 16, and aged 16 but less than 18) as a general guide for constructing dummy 
variables to control for household composition.  I create eight categories defined by the number 
of children in the household and their ages. 
Approximately 7,000 households complete the Family Expenditure Survey in any given 
year.  For this analysis, the sample is limited to households with one man, one woman who is 
recorded as the wife of the household head and less than age 60, and one to three children
11.  This 
results in a total sample size of 15,810 households for 8 years of data.  I use data from 1973 to 
1983 but drop the intermediate years, 1977-1979, during which the Child Benefit policy change 
was phased in.  I create three binary variables for the post-policy-change period, one for each 
family size, allowing for the policy to affect families of different sizes in a general way. 
Price indices from the Abstract of National Statistics are used.  These indices are 
available quarterly for 11 broadly defined goods categories, as well as for all goods combined 
(the Retail Price Index).  In estimates of narrowly defined clothing expenditures, I use detailed 
price indices obtained from the Office for National Statistics in the U.K.  These indices are 
available monthly for a number of narrowly defined goods, including men's clothing, women's 
clothing, and children's clothing.
12  The two sets of price indices come from the same source, but 
the latter is aggregated to a lesser degree.  Neither set is available separately by region. 
                                                           
11 Adults are defined as all persons age 18 and over, and married persons irrespective of age. 
12 The children’s clothing price index is unavailable prior to 1974.   11
III. Empirical Models 
  The basic empirical model is an adaptation of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a,b).  The budget share for each good can be estimated equation-
by-equation using: 
log log ( , , , )
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                 (1) 
where wig is the budget share for good category g for household i;  pg is the relative price for 
good category g, computed by dividing the national price index for that category by the Retail 
Price Index.
13  Ci is total household consumption or expenditure.  Ii is the household-specific 
price index for all goods, approximated by log log ii g g
g
I wp =∑ .
14  D is a set of dummy 
variables representing the policy change, and H is a vector of household demographic variables.  
Q is the quarter of the year in which the household was surveyed, t measures a time trend, and uig 
is an error term with standard properties.  This model can be estimated equation-by-equation 
using ordinary least squares regression. 
  Given expenditure diary data for a two-week period, many households will record zero 
expenditures on some goods.  The correct empirical model to apply depends on the mechanism 
generating those zeroes.  If a household does not consume a particular good, as may be the case 
with alcohol or tobacco, then the tobit model can be applied.  However, if a good is consumed by 
the household but not purchased during the period, such as in the case of clothing, then the tobit 
                                                           
13 While inclusion of all prices is preferred, multicolinearity results if all prices are included due to the short time 
series and absence of cross-sectional (regional) price variation.  Narrowly defined clothing estimates do include all 
three narrow clothing prices. 
14 According to Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) this approximation was used by J. R. N. Stone.  No particular work 
is cited.  I use broad category expenditures and corresponding price indices to calculate this index.   12
model is not the correct specification.  In this case, OLS is consistent under fairly weak 
conditions.
15 
  I use OLS to estimate the model in (1) for all goods.  I also present tobit estimates of the 
model for goods which a substantial fraction of households may choose to not consume, such as 
alcohol and tobacco.  If both non-consumption and purchase frequency play a role, then the truth 
is probably somewhere between the results of the two models. 
  
Instrumental Variables Estimation to Correct for Measurement Error 
As above, let us assume that expenditure and consumption are equal on average for a 
sufficiently long time period, in essence that E(yig) = E(yig
*) for household i, good g.  If we 
observe expenditure by a household for a random two-week period, we can write the relationship 
of observed expenditure to unobserved consumption as y
*
ig=yig+eig, where eig can be thought of 
as a mean-zero  measurement error.  This implies that total expenditure will be higher in periods 
when clothing is purchased than in periods when it is not.  Normally, measurement error in the 
dependent variable is not a concern, but eig will also enter in total consumption, which is a 
regressor.  For simplicity, suppose only consumption of good 1 is measured with error, so that 
total consumption equals total expenditure plus ei1:  
*
1 Total Consumption where Total Expenditure   ii gi g i ii g
gg g
Cy y e Ey ≡≡ = + ≡≡ ∑∑ ∑  
We can substitute into equation (1) and rearrange terms to obtain: 
                                                           
15 A purchase infrequency model (see Cragg 1971or Blundell and Meghir 1987) might be used, but there are 
problems with applying it here.  First, it is difficult to find convincing exclusion restrictions – i.e., measured 
variables that affect consumption but not frequency of purchase, or vice versa.  Second, for purchases made on 
credit, only payments toward the purchase, not the total purchase amount, get recorded in the data.  Third, zeroes 
may be observed for some goods in the data, such as alcohol and tobacco, for both non-consumption and purchase 
infrequency reasons.  A double-hurdle model allows for both, but the two portions of the model cannot be 
convincingly identified using these data.   13
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This gives us the measured budget share on the left-hand side.  Note that the regressor, total 
consumption, is correlated with the error term through the presence of ei1 in both terms.  We can 
instrument for total expenditure where it is used as a regressor intended to measure total 
consumption, arguably getting closer to a true measure of total consumption and doing away 
with some of the measurement error.  However, some correlation between the regressor and error 
term will remain because total expenditure appears in the denominator of the latter.  Further, 
estimated coefficients on regressors will be scaled by total consumption over total expenditure.  
However, as long as these are equal on average, this ratio is unity. 
  Because the specification of the AIDS model calls for the consumption share and not the 
level of expenditure to be estimated, elimination of measurement error bias in estimates is not 
assured by instrumenting for total expenditure.  Note that if we estimate consumption levels 
instead, our equation would be the following: 
1
11 1 1 log log ( , , , )
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  where   11 1 ii i ue ε = −    (4) 
In this case, instrumenting for total expenditure is sufficient to eliminate the bias, given that 
instruments used are appropriate. 
  Keen (1986) uses “normal income” (based on usual rather than current earnings) to 
instrument for total expenditure in estimating Engel curves using a single year of FES data, and 
shows that this produces consistent estimates.  If macroeconomic conditions are constant, then 
consumption should be approximately proportional to normal income.  However, changes in   14
macroeconomic conditions may affect saving rates and therefore the proportion of normal 
income consumed in a given period. 
  I use normal income and regional quarterly unemployment rates as instruments for total 
expenditure.  Because normal income is zero in some cases, a log specification, to match that for 
total expenditure, is not feasible.  I find that a fifth-order polynomial in normal income and a 
third-order polynomial in unemployment rate provides the best fit.  These variables are used as 
instruments in two-stage least-squares estimates of both the budget share and the level of 
expenditure for each of the three clothing categories 
  If clothing is separable from other goods, and if clothing is the only good for which 
consumption and expenditure during the survey period may differ, then standard OLS and tobit 
models will suffice for other goods.  These are strong assumptions.  Clearly, other goods also 
suffer from purchase infrequency.  These may include durables, haircuts, toys, and books to 
name a few.  Therefore instrumental variables methods will also be used in estimating 
expenditure shares and levels for eleven broadly defined goods categories and nine additional 
narrowly defined goods. .  In cases where a tobit model should be used, I estimate total 
expenditure using the instruments discussed above as regressors in an OLS model and enter the 
estimated total expenditure in the tobit model.  I’ll refer to this as a two-stage tobit model.
16  OLS 
estimates of total expenditure using the instruments as regressors (the first stage) is shown in 
Appendix A.  All regressors are significant at the one percent level or better, with the exception 
of the quadratic normal income term.  The adjusted R squared for the model is 0.36. 
  Recall that in order for the measurement error to be mean zero, we require a sufficiently 
long time period so that average consumption equals average expenditure.  The length of this 
                                                           
16 Standard errors have not been corrected in two-stage tobit estimates.  This is unlikely to affect inference for the   15
time period may differ for different goods.  In particular, I will assume that three months is not a 
sufficiently long period for clothing, and so will not control for quarter of the year in clothing 
estimates.
17  Though I do control for quarter in estimates of other goods, I check whether effects 
of the policy change are affected by inclusion versus exclusion of these variables for goods for 
which a quarter is arguably too short to assume expenditure equals consumption, such as 
durables, books, and toys. 
  An additional method will also be used which allows estimation of the budget share 
while minimizing concerns about appearance of total expenditure in the denominator of the error 
term.  I subtract clothing and durables expenditures from total expenditure and use the result to 
proxy for total expenditure, both on the right-hand side and in the share calculation.  Standard 
OLS and tobit models are then used to estimate budget shares.  These results are compared to IV 
results as a check of robustness. 
 
IV. Results 
  I estimate budget shares and expenditure levels for eleven broadly defined goods 
categories and twelve narrowly defined goods, including three assignable clothing categories.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics, including means of total expenditure and income measures, 
and expenditure shares and levels for the goods of interest.  The number of households reporting 
positive expenditures in each good category is also given.  The distribution of families across the 
three family-size categories is shown.  Almost half of families in the sample have two children.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
policy change variables which are the focus of this paper. 
17 Clothing consumption need not be greater in colder months. We may wear more clothes at once in colder months, 
but may use as many clothing services in warm months due to summer activities and more frequent washing, 
especially in the case of children’s clothes.   16
Thus, the omitted household composition category in estimates is the most common child-age 
category among two-child families. 
  Table 2 presents results for instrumental variable estimates of the eleven broad goods 
categories.  Panels (a) and (c) show budget share estimates while panels (b) and (d) show 
expenditure level estimates.  Because more than five percent of households report zero 
expenditures on alcohol, clothing, food out and tobacco, both two-stage least squares and two-
stage tobit estimates are reported for these two categories (panels c and d).  TSLS estimates are 
reported for the remaining seven categories (panels a and b): durables, food for home preparation 
(food in), fuel and power (not including fuel for automobiles), housing, services, transportation 
(including petrol), and miscellaneous goods.  The three policy shift variables (for one-, two-, and 
three-child families) had a positive and significant effect on expenditure shares and levels for 
clothing, food out, and miscellaneous goods.  It had negative and significant effects on 
expenditure shares and levels for housing.  There is also some evidence of decline in alcohol 
expenditures, particularly in three-child families, although this result is not significant in tobit 
models, which are theoretically more appealing given that there may be non-consuming 
households. 
  Estimates for broadly defined goods are done equation by equation, and no constraint on 
adding up of shares is imposed.
18  F-tests and likelihood ratio tests were used for each of the 
broad goods to test the joint hypothesis that the three policy shift dummies had no effect.  These 
tests indicate that the policy shift did significantly affect budget shares for several of the 
categories, increasing clothing, food out, and miscellaneous goods expenditures and decreasing 
expenditures on housing and “food in.”  The durables estimates were also done excluding 
                                                           
18 The sum of TSLS policy change coefficients for budget shares for a given size family is approximately zero.   17
controls for quarter of the year and the results on policy variables, which are not statistically 
different from zero, were virtually unchanged.  Table 2 also reports a chi-square statistic based 
on a seemingly unrelated regressions system of equations (estimated with instruments using 
three-stage least squares) testing the joint hypothesis that effects of the three policy variables in 
all eleven equations are zero.  This hypothesis is strongly rejected, indicating that the policy shift 
did significantly change overall expenditure patterns. 
  Phipps and Burton (1998) and Hoddinott and Haddad (1991) found negative effects of 
the wife’s relative income on tobacco and alcohol.  I find marginal negative effects for alcohol.  
Though I find only slight evidence of negative effects for all tobacco, I do find negative effects 
for a men’s tobacco category, which excludes cigarettes.  Phipps and Burton also found positive 
effects of the wife's income on restaurant meals.  This could be interpreted as a price effect since 
the study uses earned income as the key explanatory variable.  The exogeneity of the policy 
change in the present analysis rules out such an interpretation here of the strong positive effect 
on “food out,” which includes restaurant meals and take-away food. 
  An alternate method in which total expenditure less clothing and durables expenditures is 
used as a proxy measure of total consumption in estimating budget shares yields somewhat 
similar results (shown in Table B1 of Appendix B) to those on broadly-defined goods using IV 
methods.  In general, signs of coefficients on the policy variables are the same, but statistical 
significance in most cases is stronger.  Some differences from the IV models should be 
highlighted:  Here, the negative coefficients for tobacco in one- and two-child families is 
significant in the OLS model, but not the tobit model.  To the extent that purchase infrequency is 
a more important generator of zeroes than non-consumption, the OLS estimates are preferred to 
the tobit.  Alcohol does decline significantly here for one- and three-child families in the tobit   18
model, and the negative coefficients in the “food in” equation are significant for all family sizes.  
Two stark differences emerge – effects on durables here are positive and significant and effects 
on fuel and power negative and significant.  This differs markedly from the IV models, and 
involves switching signs of coefficients, although they were far from statistically different from 
zero in the earlier models.  Again, a seemingly unrelated regressions system of equations is used 
to test the joint hypothesis that policy variables in all equations have zero effect, and again the 
hypothesis is strongly rejected (p<.001). 
  Table 3 reports results from expenditure share equations on nine narrowly defined goods.  
All of these goods had more than five percent zero expenditures reported, so both OLS and tobit 
results are presented.  For goods which are arguably consumed by most or all households in the 
sample but which are purchased infrequently, least squares estimates are theoretically more 
appealing, as discussed earlier.  However, it may be that, for some of these goods, there is both 
non-consumption and infrequent purchase (e.g., pets expenditures).  A model which 
distinguishes these empirically cannot be convincingly identified with this data.  I therefore 
present both two-stage least squares and two-stage tobit estimates.   
  Cigarettes expenditures do not appear to have been affected by the policy change, but 
other tobacco expenditures did decline, significantly for two-child families, which comprise 
almost half of the sample.  The joint test of all three policy variables having no effect on other 
tobacco is rejected in the levels estimates.  This category includes cigars and pipe tobacco, 
almost exclusively consumed by men, whereas cigarettes are a gender-neutral good, widely 
consumed by both men and women in the UK.   
  Domestic services, which might be viewed as a substitute for the wife’s home production, 
appear to have increased for one-child families per the tobit results, but declined for two-child   19
families per the least squares model.  There are most certainly non-consumers, but purchase 
frequency may also play a role.  The significant joint test statistics are puzzling and not very 
informative given that coefficient signs differ for different family sizes.  Cosmetics expenditures 
decline significantly.  While these goods are directly consumed mostly by women, one might 
argue that the husband derives utility from their use, or that their use by the wife may elevate her 
relative bargaining power by increasing the value of her outside options relative to those of her 
husband.  Hairdressing includes trips to the barber or stylist for all family members, and does not 
appear to be affected by the policy change. 
  In panels (c) and (d), we see a positive effect on books, but this is only significant in tobit 
models.  Children’s books cannot be distinguished from adult books in the data.  The books 
category also includes some other reading materials, such as periodicals.  While it is unlikely 
there are many households in this sample who don’t consume in this category, consumption may 
be via borrowed library materials, so that expenditure and consumption do not relate to one 
another in the way I have specified above.  There is also most probably an important frequency 
of purchase element here. 
  Pets expenditures appear unaffected, while toys are increasing for one- and two-child 
families.  There are likely few non-consumers of toys in this sample, but purchase frequency is 
likely to be important.  Children’s pocket money is increasing, significantly for one- and (in one 
model) two-child families.  Results from proxied OLS models for these nine narrowly-defined 
goods are quite similar to those in instrumented estimates (see Table B2 of Appendix B). 
  Table 4 reports two-stage least squares shares and levels estimates, and proxied OLS 
estimates for the three narrow clothing categories.  All three models show strong and statistically 
significant positive effects of the policy change on children's clothing.  Policy change   20
coefficients are consistently negative for men's clothing in all three models, and the effect is 
statistically significant for three-child families in both instrumented models.  The coefficients are 
consistently positive for women’s clothing across all three models, and are statistically 
significant in two- and three-child families in the proxied OLS model.  A test of the joint 
hypothesis for all three policy variables for women’s clothing shows a statistically significant 
effect in both the instrumented share estimates and the proxied share estimates. 
  Results found here on men’s, women's, and children’s clothing are consistent with those 
found by Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997).  They found that the ratio of children's clothing 
expenditures to men's clothing expenditures increased when the child benefit policy changed.  
They also found an increase in the ratio of expenditures on women's clothing to that on men's 
clothing.  As discussed earlier, their results on children’s relative to men’s clothing may be 
attributable in part to the 1979 change in VAT rates on children’s relative to adult clothing.
 19  
The decline they find in men’s clothing relative to women’s clothing is unlikely to have been 
driven by the change in tax rates, since the tax rate change on both goods was the same, but the 
tax inclusive price of children's clothing relative to adult clothing may have declined 
significantly.  Thus, their result on children's relative to men's clothing expenditures is of 
particular concern.  The results I have presented here are compelling given that narrow price 
indices with VAT included were used to control for prices of the three separate clothing 
categories.  These results demonstrate that the increase in the relative share of children's goods 
they find was not solely due to tax rate changes, but is attributable in part to the child benefit 
policy change, and to the apparent preference of mothers to allocate more of the family budget to 
children's goods.  
                                                           
19 VAT rates were 10% in 1973, changing to 8% in 1974, and to 15% in 1979.  Young children's clothing and   21
  The magnitudes of changes in budget shares these results suggest are certainly plausible 
given the amount of income being shifted from men to women.  For instance, for the average 
two-child family, the change in expenditures on the broad category "food out" attributable to the 
policy change is £26 per year.  As a result of the policy change, the same family decreased its 
annual housing expenditure by £90 and men’s tobacco expenditure by £3, and increased 
children’s clothing expenditures by £16 and toys expenditures by £5.  These are reasonable 




  I use micro data to examine how budget shares changed in two-parent families with 
children in the U.K. when a change in Family Allowance policy essentially shifted transfer 
income from fathers to mothers.  Shifts in expenditure patterns due to this change are 
inconsistent with the unitary model of household decisions.  I find significant changes in 
expenditures on broadly defined goods, as well as on some narrowly defined assignable and 
quasi-assignable goods.  Although the broad goods categories do not represent assignable goods, 
a discrete change in shares in the before versus after period which is not attributable to other 
factors indicates that there has been a shift of power over decision making in the household, and 
that a systematic difference in preferences over allocation of household income exists between 
husbands and wives.  Closer examination of expenditures on narrow goods within these broad 
categories produces further insights.  These shifts indicate that women and children benefited at 
the expense of men when this new policy took effect. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
footwear became zero-rated in 1979.  (Prest, 1980) 
20 The quoted magnitudes of change are in 1974 currency, and are based on TSLS budget share estimates.   22
  Results on narrow goods generally point to an increase in the budget share allocated to 
some women’s and children’s goods, along with a decline in that for some men’s goods.  Such 
changes in consumption patterns resulting from a shift in the control of income in the household 
adds evidence to the growing case against the unitary model — evidence which is particularly 
convincing given the exogeneity of this policy shift.   
  Rejection of the unitary model has important implications for the effectiveness of policies 
aimed at improving welfare of targeted members of households.  The unitary model implies 
neutralization of targeted transfers.  Some alternative collective models allow for more effective 
transfer policy.  As Alderman, et. al. put it, it may be "time to shift the burden of proof."  
Analyzing the household allocation process within the framework of collective models will 
allow the development and application of more effective policies in areas of health, education, 
and welfare.   23
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
  Share of Budget Real  Level #  positive 
Variable Mean
† Std  Dev Mean
† Std  Dev  observations 
Broadly-defined goods   
Alcohol  0.043 (0.047) 2.041 (2.745) 13474
Clothing  0.078 (0.076) 4.059 (5.205) 14953
Durables  0.063 (0.091) 3.761 (9.932) 15559
Food in  0.231 (0.087) 9.976 (3.759) 16131
Food out  0.034 (0.032) 1.693 (2.035) 15014
Fuel, power, & light  0.062 (0.041) 2.701 (1.991) 16085
Housing  0.150 (0.079) 7.016 (7.173) 16109
Misc  0.085 (0.056) 4.152 (4.458) 16130
Sevices  0.086 (0.082) 4.798 (9.520) 16113
Tobacco  0.036 (0.043) 1.491 (1.675) 10426
Transport  0.132 (0.111) 6.949 (11.530) 15815
Narrowly-defined goods   
Women’s clothing  0.027 (0.042) 1.445 (2.740) 11046
Men’s clothing  0.018 (0.041) 1.008 (2.695) 5906
Kid’s clothing  0.027 (0.039) 1.327 (2.176) 10469
Cigarettes  0.034 (0.043) 1.370 (1.659) 9429
Other tobacco  0.003 (0.010) 0.121 (0.434) 2457
Domestic services  0.004 (0.015) 0.199 (0.899) 2362
Cosmetics  0.005 (0.009) 0.251 (0.509) 9816
Hairdressing  0.005 (0.010) 0.256 (0.519) 5805
Books  0.003 (0.010) 0.185 (0.694) 5676
Toys  0.008 (0.022) 0.391 (1.239) 5954
Pets expenditure  0.008 (0.018) 0.363 (0.978) 8167
Children’s pocket money  0.004 (0.009) 0.199 (0.483) 5987
  
Real total expenditure    48.802 (28.086)  
Log real total exp      3.782 (0.436)  
Predicted log real expenditure      3.782 (0.262)  
Real total expenditure less 
       clothing & durables  20.469 (18.205)
 
Real normal income  
       (from earnings)  46.767 (37.864)
 
   
N = 16131   
   
# children in family  Frequency Percent   
1 5513  34.2   
2 7721  47.9   
3 2897  18.0   
 
† Means and standard deviations are for full sample. 
Expenditure levels are £ per week in 1974 currency. 
Mean shares are computed using total expenditure.  Means of shares computed using expenditure excluding 
clothing and durables are proportionally larger, and are not constrained to be less than or equal to unity. 
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